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PRELIMINARY
September, 30, 1985 Conference
List 11, Sheet 1
~

No. 84-1656
LOCAL 28, SHEET MET~-·~-, Q
WORKERS' INT'L AS~~~

v.

.

Cert to CA2 (Pratt,
Mansfield: Winter--dissent)

~p eL

EEOC ~

1.

SUMMARY:

Fed./Civ.

Timely

Petrs contend that the district court

exceeded its Title VII remedial powers by imposing an
affirmative action plan on them containing ri id goals or

~~at ca~_!__ be j~stified

as a legitimate remedy for

their past violations of Title VII.

~ANI-

fn t/
tJtl£f2- -7

-
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Petrs include a union of

sheet metal workers in the New York metropolitan area and its
committee responsible for its apprenticeship program.

A

majority of the union's members have traditionally come up
through the apprenticeship program, a four-year course designed
to teach sheet metal skills.

A student entering the program is

indentured, and upon graduation becomes a journeyman.
This case began in 1971 when the United States filed a
Title VII suit against petrs to enjoin their pattern and
practice of discriminating against nonwhites in union
membership.

The district court found that petrs had

------- -

purposefully denied nonwhites membership in the union in
"-

----

-- ~___..._

---

---------...._

violation of Title VII.

Petrs had accomplished this goal

primarily by blocking the entry of nonwhites into the
apprenticeship program through the use of invalid entrance
exams, a requirement that applicants possess a high school
diploma, and inquiries into applicants' arrest records.

The

district court entered judgment and created an affirmative
action program (AAP) as a remedy.

The petrs were ordered t J

achieve a nonwhite membership "goal" of 29% by July 1, 1981,
with interim percentage goals also set.

The court appointe

a

special master called an "administrator" to supervise
compliance with the AAP.
The CA2 initially affirmed the finding of a Title VII
violation, but reversed part of the relief granted.

On remand,

the district court entered a revised affirmative action program
(RAAP) that, inter alia, retained the elements previously
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mentioned.

A divided CA2 affirmed.

In April 1982, the city and state of New York moved to
have petrs held in contempt for failing to reach the RAAP's 29 %
goal.

The district court granted the motion, but rather than

base its contempt order directly on failure to meet the goal,
it based the order on (1) underutilization of the
apprenticeship program, (2) refusal to conduct an adequate
publicity campaign, (3) adoption of a job protection plan that
favored older, and hence white, members, (4) issuance of
unauthorized work permits to whites from sister unions, and (5)
failure to maintain and submit records and reports.

The court

determined that these violations of the RAAP thwarted the
achievement of the goal.

The court imposed a fine of $150,000

to be placed in a training fund to increase nonwhite membership
in the union's apprenticeship program and ordered the
administrator to develop a plan for use of the fund.
In April 1983, New York City again instituted contempt
proceedings against petrs, this time before the RAAP's
administrator.

The administrator concluded that petrs were in

contempt of outstanding court orders requiring them to provide
records of the race and national origin of all applicants for
union membership.

As a remedy, the administrator suggested

that petrs pay for computerized record keeping and make further
payments to the training fund that the administrator was
developing.

The district court adopted the administrator's

recommendations, but deferred setting an amount for the
training fund contribution until the administrator submitted
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his proposal outlining a plan for the fund.

In September 1983,

the administrator submitted his proposed plan, stating that the
fund would be used to encourage nonwhite membership in the
union and be financed by the previous fines and a $.02 per hou r
labor tax on union members.

The district court issued a

contempt order adopting the administrator's proposal.
The district court issued still another contempt order in' \
September 1983, this time adoptin

an amended affirmative

action program (AAAP) that (1) increased the nonwhite
membership goal from 29% to 29.23% to be reached by July 31,
1987, (2) established an apprentice to journeyman ratio of 1:4 ~~
( 3) created a three-member apprentice select ion board,

-------

( 4)

imposed a nonwhite to white ratio of 1:1 for admittance into
~-~

the apprenticeship program, (5) permitted work on new
---~
procedures to be used after the goal was reached, and (6)
incorporated the order requiring petrs to pay the costs of
advisor to monitor the computerization of the records.
A divided CA2 affirmed all the contempt orders and
-~

penalties, and sustained the AAAP with minor modifications.
The CA2 upheld the district court's initial order holding petrs
in contempt for failure to meet the RAAP's 29% goal because
four of the five violations of the RAAP that the district court
found were correct and this provided sufficient basis for the
order.

In particular, the CA2 concluded that, although the

district court had based its important finding relating to
underutilization of the apprenticeship program on a
misunderstanding of the statistics, the finding was supported

d~
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by other sufficient evidence.

The CA2 reversed the district

court's finding that the job protection plan constituted
contumacious conduct on the ground that the provision had never
been implemented, but concluded that reversal of this one
finding did not make the order invalid.
The CA2 also affirmed the

distric~

court's contempt order

issued for petrs' lack of recordkeeping, concluding that the
order was supported by clear and convincing evidence showing
that petrs had not been reasonably diligent in attempting to
comply with the particular orders of the court and the
administrator.

The CA2 rejected petrs' contention that the

contempt remedies were punitive and therefore could not be
imposed except after a criminal proceeding.

The court found

that the fund order was compensatory because its purpose was to
improve the route of nonwhites to union membership and that it
was coercive because it would remain in effect until the new
29.23% goal was achieved.
The CA2 likewise rejected most of petrs' objections to the
AAAP established by the September order, holding that the AAAP
did not violate Title VII or the Constitution.

It rejected

petrs' argument that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), prohibits race-conscious relief
for Title VII violations "except that [which] benefit[s]
specifically identified victims of past discrimination."
Instead, it read Stotts as limiting the scope of race-conscious
relief only when such relief conflicts with a bona fide
seniority plan, when "make whole" rather than prospective

-

t>

-

relief is involved, and when there has been no finding of
intentional discrimination.
present.

Here, none of these factors was

The appeals court then upheld various changes made by

the AAAP in pe trs' affirmative action obligation.
particular,

it~~ufed
____,

In

that the 29.23% nonwhite membership

objective was not a permanent "quota," but only a temporary and
~

permissible "goal."

The court stated that the

g~a_?..

was a

---·~

remedy for past discrimination and added that it "will not
----·~

' - - - -· -

unnecessarily trammel the rights of any readily ascertainable
group of nonminority individuals."

Nevertheless, the court

struck down that portion of the AAAP that required the
selection of one nonwhite for every white who enters the
apprenticeship program.

It reasoned that because 45% of petrs'

indentures in the past had been nonwhite and a selection board
would oversee the future selection process, the one-for-one
quota was unnecessary.
§.ige

W ~t~ r _9i~~ from the court's affirmance of the

'

order holding petrs in contempt for failing to meet the RAAP's
29% goal largely because of the majority's failure "to address
---......,__...

--

---......._-.

------------~

the fact that Local 28 had the approval of the administrator
-~

-----~--------

for every act it took that affected the number of minority
----~

workers entering the sheet metal industry."

The RAAP granted

the administrator broad discretion to balance the goal of
increased nonwhite membership with economic constraints.
petrs fully complied with the heart of the program.

Thus,

By

nevertheless imposing sanctions on petrs for failing to meet
the 29% nonwhite membership goal, the district court
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transformed the "goal" into an inflexible "quota" in violation
of Title VII and probably the Constitution.

Judge Winter

explained that statistics in the record refuted the district
court's central finding that the apprenticeship program had
been underutilized.

I

Because the economics of the sheet metal

industry had been depressed during the relevant period, the
"reactive finger pointing at Local 28 is a faintly camouflaged
holding that journeymen should have been replaced by minority
apprentices on a strictly racial basis."

He argued that such a

requirement "is at odds with [Stotts], which iejected such a
use of racial preference as a remedy under Title VII."

Judge

Winter also dissented from the order establishing a training
fund on the ground that factual findings establishing a need
for such a fund had not been made.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs first contend that imposition of

the RAAP and AAAP exceeded the district court's remedial powers
granted by Title VII because the programs either did or do
impose a race-conscious quota broader than is necessary to
remedy the effects of past discrimination to actual victims.
They argue that the CA2's reading of Stotts was unfairly
narrow, but that, if not, the Court should grant cert to
determine the permissible breadth of coercive race-conscious
remedies for Title VII violations.

Petrs also contend that the

district court's order adopting the AAAP violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment by requiring petrs
to enroll nonwhites in the apprenticeship program who are not
identifiable victims of the union's past discrimination.

-

8 -

Furthermore, the CA2's construction of Title VII as allowing
the district court to impose the AAAP on petrs transforms Title
VII into an unconstitutional bill of attainder on the heirs of
the persons attainted in violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the practice of "corruption of blood."
See

u.s.

Const. art. I, §9, cl. 3.

Petrs cite County of Oneida

v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1275 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The Framers recognized that no one ought to be

condemned for his forefathers misdeeds."), as an example of the
Court's repeated objection to such discriminatory legislation.
Petrs also argue that the contempt sanctions violate due
process because they are punitive rather than compensatory or
designed to compel compliance with prior court orders.

Due

process allows such sanctions only in the context of criminal
proceedings.

Furthermore, petrs argue that the CA2 should have

reversed the district court simply because it erroneously
interpreted the statistical study of the apprenticeship program
as implying that the program had been underutilized while the
RAAP was in effect.

Finally, they argue that the use of a

special master to administer the affirmative action program
violates the union's right to self-governance, which is
protected by §40l(a) of the LMRA.
Resps, city and state of New York, argue that petrs'
appeal should be dismissed as an untimely challenge to the
initial 1971 determination of a Title VII violation and
imposition of the RAAP.

They also argue that the contempt

orders were appropriately compensatory and coercive rather than

punitive.

~

-

They further argue that the CA2's distinction of

Stotts is correct, the imposition of a race-conscious program
is an appropriate remedy, and there is no split in the circuits
that needs to be resolved.

Finally, they contend that the AAAP

and funding order are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling
goal of eradicating proven systematic discrimination.
On behalf of resp EEOC, the SG argues that petrs' only
~

issue meriting review is the one "relating to the failure to
abide
by racial...._....-.---quotas contained in [the RAAP] as a proper
_______._,
basis for a finding of contempt, as well as the imposition of
such quotas as part of the remedial scheme of the [AAAP] ."

The

other issues are highly fact-bound and therefore inappropriate
for review.

The SG argues that even the meritorious issues in

this case are not optimal candidates for cert because they are
inextricably interwoven with the other fact-bound issues and
because the issue is presented in a far clearer form in Local
No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, cert. pending, No. 84-1999, in which the United
States, as amicus curiae, has urged the Court to grant cert.
The SG admits that the AAAP's 29.23% "goal" is really a "quota"
because "fines that will threaten [petrs'] very existence" have
been threatened if it is not met.

But the question is

unnecessarily complicated because it is unclear the extent to
which the quota was imposed to remedy prior Title VII
violations or instead as an exercise of the district court's
contempt power.

In addition, the Court will likely consider

the validity of racial quotas under the Fourteenth Amendment

-

granted, No. 84-1340.

lU -

'

Thus, the SG requests that cert be

granted in the City of Cleveland case, and that this case be
held pending its disposition and that of Wygant.
In a reply to the SG, petrs argue that neither the City of
Cleveland case nor Wygant will resolve the issue presented here
because both involve "voluntary" consent decrees instead of
court-imposed remedies, and Wygant involves the Fourteenth

--

Amendment instead of Title VII.
4.

DISCUSSION:

/ ~~

In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.

193 (1979), the Court held that Title VII leaves private
employers and unions free to take voluntary race-conscious
steps to eliminate "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories."

But Weber began its analysis by

stating:

We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry.
• • • [S] ince the Kaiser-USWA plan was ado ted vo u t ril , we
are not concerned with what Title VII requires or with what a
court might order to remedy a past proved- violation of the Act.
~,

at 200.

This case squarely presents the issue left open

in Weber.
~

The CA2 concluded that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), did not decide the issue
presented in this case.

Indeed, Stotts touched upon, but did

not fully address, the limits of Title VII's grant of remedial
powers.

h

In Stotts, the Court struck down an order enjoining a

public employer, which was subject to an affirmative action

-

LL -

plan adopted pursuant to a consent decree, from following its
seniority system in determining lay-offs.

The Court held that

the injunction could not be justified as an effort to enforce
the consent decree because neither the decree's express terms
nor its purpose envisioned overriding the seniority system.
The Court also rejected the argument that the injunction was a
valid modification of the consent decree, reasoning that
neither Title VII's voluntary settlement policy nor its
potential remedial power could justify such a theory.

The

Court reasoned that the potential power argument was not
consistent with cases requiring a close nexus between the
remedy of competitive seniority and actual victimization from
past discrimination, nor with Title VII's policy of providing
"make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims
of illegal discrimination."
Rather than explore the limits on Title VII's remedial
power as suggested by Stotts, the CA2 chose to confine Stotts
to a rather small category of cases and to affirm the case
based on its prior decision in EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821,
828 (CA2 1976) (race-conscious goals permissible to remedy past
discrimination if reverse discrimination effect is concentrated
on relatively small group of nonminorities), cert. denied, 429

u.s.

823 (1976).

Each circuit that !has addressed a Title VII

challenge to affirmative action programs since Stotts has read
Stotts equally narrowly.

See, e.g., Deveraux v. Geary, No. 83-

1345, slip op., at 17-18 (CAl June 24, 1985); Turner v. Orr,
759 F.2d 817, 823-26 (CAll 1985) (distinguishing Stotts and

-

1:.:! -

extending Weber to consent decree programs); City of Cleveland,
753 F.2d, at 485-93 (CA6), cert. pending.

The acceptability

and permissible scope of court-imposed affirmative action
remedies under Title VII is a question of great public
importance and one whose answer need not await an intercircuit
split.

The question has already been extensively debated in

the public fora, and thus the benefit of further percolation
will be negligible.

-

Moreover, this case involves the

imposition of rigid goals or quotas, and this Court has
--

'--

;::::>;

indicated that quotas are unacceptable remedies for Title VII
violations.

Stotts, 104

s.

of California v. Bakke, 438

Ct., at 2589.

u.s.

See also University

265, 288-89 (racial quotas

violate Fourteenth Amendment whether labeled "quotas" or
"goals") •
Although the Court should seriously consider the SG's
suggestion of granting cert in the City of Cleveland case and
holding this case for it, the SG presents no sufficient reason
for refusing to grant cert in this case if cert is denied in
the City of Cleveland case.

The City of Cleveland case does

present its Title VII issue more cleanly than this case does.
But the Title VII issues in each case are not identical because
City of Cleveland involves whether a public employer may adopt
racial quotas pursuant to a consent decree.

It is unclear

whether Title VII imposes the same limitations, if any, on
quasi-voluntary affirmative action by public employers as it
does on court-imposed affirmative action by private unions.
Furthermore, the fact that the case is complicated by a

-

~J

-

possible difference between Title VII remedial powers in the
first instance and contempt powers to enforce an existing
affirmative action plan or to impose a new plan does not make
the case uncertworthy.

Numerous cases involving existing

affirmative action plans may arise under these circumstances.
Finally, the case can be made far less complicated by limiting
review to the Title VII issue rather than extending it to the
unpersuasive equal protection and due process issues or the
other issues involved in the case below, which are overly factbound.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend grant.

There are two responses and a reply.
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